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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN GYPSUM TRUST, a 
common law trust, and JOHN 
PAUL JONES, ROBERT JONES, 
JOHN RUSSELL RITTER, DONALD W. 
McEWEN and BARRY PHILLIPS, I Civil No. 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) 13919 
vs. 
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Through their Appeal Brief, plaintiffs studiously avoid either 
confronting or replying to the critical issues raised in the brief of 
defendant. Instead, they seek to divert the attention of this Court 
from those issues through broad brush and erroneous characteriza-
tions of defendant's motives, of the state of this Record on Appeal 
and of legal conclusions to be drawn therefrom. 
I. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTIVE BELOW AND ITS PUR-
POSE IN PROCESSING THIS APPEAL WAS TO 
ENFORCE THE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS 
1 
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PROVISIONS OF THE "FIFTY-YEAR LEASE" 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES AS CONSTRUED BY 
THE "DECLARATORY JUDGMENT" ENTERED 
BY THE COURT BELOW IN THE PRIOR CASE. 
Plaintiffs' assertion at pages 2 and 3 of their brief that defen-
dant has mis-stated to this Court the nature of this litigation with a 
purpose to obtain "a complete re-trial" and "reversal" of the 
"Declaratory Judgment previously entered by the trial court" 
could not be further from the fact and the truth. The controlling 
lease language is quoted verbatim at pages 4 and 5 of defendant's 
brief. Royalty payments thereunder are conditioned upon the av-
ailability on the leasehold premises of "rock of the kind and 
quality needed." [Emphasis added] The lease language specifi-
cally mandates that the 7% net profit royalty must be ' 'determined 
in accordance with sound accounting principles and practices in 
the gypsum industry." [Emphasis added] In interpreting and 
clarifying the rights and obligations of the parties in computing the 
7% royalty, the court below in the Amended Declaratory Judg-
ment (R. 414-15), mandated by the opinion of this Court, ruled 
that the same in the future must be calculated by the accounting 
' 'method approved by the lessor and utilized by the parties in the 
years prior to 1965" [Emphasis added] 
As defendant points out in its opening brief, plaintiffs, not 
defendant, seek to circumvent the clear and plain meaning of that 
language. This Lease language has been in the Lease since its 
inception, was not changed or modified in any way by the prior 
Judgment of Judge Erickson, by the prior opinion of this Court or 
by the Amended Declaratory Judgment. Plaintiffs consented to, 
and indeed sponsored, the critical language quoted above from the 
2 
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Amended Declaratory Judgment designed to govern prospective 
performance under the Lease. This clear and precise language 
from the Lease and the Amended Declaratory Judgment are bind-
ing upon the parties, were binding upon the Court below and, it is 
respectfully urged, are binding upon this Court. We here seek to 
have the 7% royalty calculated in strict conformance with this 
controlling language for calendar years 1971, 1972, and 1973. 
Plaintiffs criticize defendant for characterizing plaintiffs' suit 
as an action for "damages for breach of Lease." They assert that 
the same in fact is an action to enforce the "Declaratory Judg-
ment." However, regardless of the form of the characterization, 
the issue between the parties is the proper interpretation of the 
Lease language as construed in the Amended Declaratory Judg-
ment. The plaintiffs submitted evidence at the trial which was 
received and incorporated into Findings, Conclusions and Judg-
ment that the sum of $330,859.66 was due for calendar years 
1971, 1972 and 1973. Defendant submitted, by way of offer of 
proof, both testimony and documentary evidence showing that the 
amounts due under the language of the Lease, so construed, range 
from the sum of $161,597.00 to $247,157.00, depending upon the 
production level selected by the trier of fact for the period in 
question. 
A determination of whether the plaintiffs' number or the 
defendant's number is correct turns upon four basic issues offact: 
1. What was the accounting "method approved by the lessor 
and utilized by the parties in the years prior to 1965?" 
As defendant discusses at length in its opening brief, plaintiffs 
offered no evidence on this subject. Defendant properly proffered 
3 
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admissible evidence on this subject which was erroneously re-
jected by the Court below. (Tr. 109). 
2. Are actual books and records available from which the 7% 
net royalty can be computed? 
Plaintiffs' accounting witness testified that there were not. 
However, defendant proffered competent and admissible account-
ing testimony by an expert that such records were available, were 
examined personally by him, and were the basis of the royalty 
figures which he computed and which are contained in Exhibits A, 
B and C, each of which was received in evidence as a proper 
proffer of proof, but erroneously rejected as evidence by the Court 
below upon the grounds of relevancy. (Tr. 108, 113). 
3. What is the amount of the 7% net royalty owing for calendar 
years 1971-73, utilizing the "method approved by the lessor and 
utilized by the parties in years prior to 1965" consistent with 
"sound accounting principles and practices in the gypsum indus-
try"? 
Plaintiffs' expert stated an opinion as to the appropriate sum 
which was erroneously received by the Court over proper objec-
tion of defendant and incorporated into Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment. Defendant's expert witness, through testimony and 
documentary evidence, tendered and received by the Court below 
as a proffer of proof, but erroneously rejected as evidence, showed 
different amounts due. (Tr. 114-15) 
4. Was there sufficient ore in the leased premises of the kind 
and quality required to manufacture all of the gypsum products 
sold by defendant in 1971, 1972 and 1973 in the defined market 
area? 
4 
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Plaintiffs elected to ignore completely this requirement of the 
express Lease language and of the Amended Declaratory Judg-
ment and offered no evidence on this subject. Defendant offered to 
show by competent testimony the absence of a requisite amount of 
ore. Defendant's evidence was accepted as a proper proffer of 
proof but erroneously rejected as evidence by the Court below. 
Our position on this appeal is that plaintiffs' evidence on these 
subjects, to the extent offered at all, was not admissible. Further-
more, even assuming arguendo admissibility of plaintiffs' evi-
dence, the Trial Court erred in rejecting the evidence proffered by 
defendant on each of these controlling and contested issues of fact. 
II. 
DEFENDANT'S PROFFER OF PROOF WAS 
PROPER, THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
PROFFERED WAS RELEVANT AND ADMISSI- -
BLE AND THE COURT BELOW GRIEVOUSLY 
ERRED IN ITS EXCLUSION. 
Plaintiffs suggest through inference and footnote at page 3 of 
their brief that defendant's proffer of proof was somehow impro-
per or insufficient in form. This suggestion has no merit what-
soever. 
Certain language of the Court below, in framing the narrow 
legal framework within which the trial was to proceed, is quoted in 
defendant's opening brief. In addition, the following colloquy 
between the Court and counsel for defendant further clarifies and 
narrows the ruling of law under which the trial then proceeded (Tr. 
32): 
5 
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THE COURT: * * * I'm concerned the only thing be-
fore this court right now is, first, whether or not the 
books are available between 70 and 73 (1) I want an 
accounting procedure and I want it based on Exhibits 
139 to 143, whatever they may say and that's really all I 
want. 
MR. TAYLOR: And you will not accept any evidence 
as to any .other accounting procedure? 
THE COURT: No sir, I won't. * * * 
Consequently, defendant's record necessarily was made by 
offer of proof. That offer was made in strict conformance to Rule 
43(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Both the testimonial 
offer and the offer of Exhibits A, B and C were received in 
evidence by the Court below as proper proffers of proof, but 
rejected as being irrelevant to the narrow legal issue as erroneously 
framed by the Court. Plaintiffs did not object to the form of the 
offer of proof, but only to its substance as being' 'outside the issues 
of the case as delineated by the Court's preliminary ruling." (Tr. 
181). The Court then ruled as to the proffered testimony of the 
numerous witnesses to be called by defendant (Tr. 122): 
The objection is sustained as to that but the proffer of 
proof is accepted over the Court's sustaining that objec-
tion. 
Similarly, defendant's accounting exhibits, demonstrating its 
version of the amounts due under the controlling lease agreement, 
were proffered in evidence by defendant. Plaintiffs objected upon 
the same ground and the Court ruled (Tr. 123): 
6 
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Well, your objection is sustained but it is accepted as to 
proffer of proof and that goes to Exhibits A, B and C. 
In further clarification, after a "foundation" objection was first 
posed and then withdrawn by plaintiffs to Exhibit C, the Court 
below ruled (Tr. 125): 
Alright, then Exhibit " C " is admitted for the purposes 
stated as a proffer of proof. 
MR. TAYLOR: But rejected as an Exhibit. 
THE COURT: That's right. 
(Whereupon defendant's Exhibits A, B and C 
were duly admitted in evidence.) 
The discussion in plaintiffs' brief setting forth what they claim 
to be "uncontroverted material facts", together with re-recitation 
of the same erroneous "facts" throughout the argument, does not 
square with the Record on Appeal. Illustrative of the numerous and 
repeated mis-statements is the summary at page 13 of plaintiffs' 
Brief stating: 
More importantly, defendant has offered no evidence 
and does not even claim that its records are not now 
subject to the other serious deficiencies that made them 
inadequate and insufficient in the prior case. / / 
defendant's offer of proof had been that there were now 
records available that were accumulated and presented 
in the same manner and by the same methods as were 
employed between the parties in the pre-1965 period, 
we would have a different case. Defendant did not 
7 
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make any such assertion in its offer of proof because 
any such assertion would be contrary to the fact. 
[Emphasis added] 
Defendant's whole proffer of proof demonstrated that we do 
here have such a "different case". The proffer of proof first 
demonstrated the precise nature of the pre-1965 accounting proce-
dure. It then proceeded to show that every record necessary to 
make the computations required by pre-1965 procedure were in 
existence for the period 1971-73, had in fact been examined by 
defendant's expert witness and were the basis of the computations 
contained in the proffered but rejected Exhibits A, B and C. 
Illustrative, defendant offered to prove that Mr. Fred Oliver, after 
having been duly qualified as an expert accounting witness, 
"would testify that sound accounting principles as applied to 
Sigurd and applied to those years 1971, 2 and 3 required the use of 
the actual and factual data in the year in which the computation 
was made if available and that they are available and that a defect 
in Exhibits 139 through 143 trying to apply them to 1971, 2 and 3 is 
that they are purely projections and unrelated to the data that is 
available and useable which Mr. Oliver will testify that he used in 
making his computations." [Tr. 113; emphasis added] 
In addition to constituting admissible evidence, this tender of 
proof removes any conceivable justification for admission in evi-
dence of plaintiffs' Exhibits 139-143 in this case. As argued at 
some length in defendant's opening brief, those exhibits, premised 
as they are upon arbitrary assumptions and projections, were 
admitted in the prior case only because of absence in that record of 
actual data. The availability of actual records for each of the years 
here in question makes inadmissible plaintiffs' guesses and projec-
tions of what those records may show. 
8 
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Rather than list each of the numerous and repeated erroneous 
statements in plaintiffs' brief concerning defendant's offer of 
proof, we simply invite the attention of the Court thereto and urge 
that the Court make its own determination of the content thereof. 
The proffer described in some detail each of the accounting ex-
hibits and carefully demonstrated that there were now records 
available that were accumulated and presented in the same manner 
and by the same methods as were employed between the parties in 
the pre-1965 period, the method required by the Amended De-
claratory Judgment, precisely contrary to plaintiffs' representa-
tions in that regard. (Plaintiffs' Brief at p. 13) 
HI. 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs misconstrue defendant's constitutional argument. 
This argument is not premised upon a failure or refusal of the Court 
below to permit defendant to make a proper proffer of proof. The 
Court below was very careful to permit defendant so to do. The 
form of the proffer was stipulated by the parties, was not objected 
to by either the Court or the parties, was accepted as a proper 
proffer by the Court and was not the subject of appeal by plaintiffs. 
The error here claimed by defendant is the Court's initial ruling not 
to receive in evidence any factual information with respect to any 
accounting procedure other than those necessarily hypothetical 
assumptions and projections which underpin Exhibits 13 9-143 in 
the prior case. The affirmance by this Court of the refusal of the 
Trial Court to receive and weigh the highly relevant evidence 
proffered by defendant would indeed constitute a deprivation of 
property without due process. 
9 
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CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to reply to a broad brush conclusory argument 
such as is contained in both the "Statement of Facts" and "Argu-
ment" in plaintiffs' Brief. To the extent the respective parties are 
claiming contrary facts in the record of this case, we invite the 
attention of the Court to the cited pages of the Record on Appeal. 
We are confident an examination of the record itself will demon-
strate the accuracy of the statements made by defendant in its 
opening Brief and will make clear beyond cavil the serious error of 
the Court below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KEITH E. TAYLOR 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
P. O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for 
Defendant-Appellant 
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